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I. Introduction 
Food-for-work (FFW) programs are commonly used both for short-term relief and 
long-term development purposes.  In the latter capacity, they are increasingly used for 
natural resources management projects. Barrett, Holden and Clay (forthcoming) 
assess the suitability of FFW programs as insurance to cushion the poor against short-
term, adverse shocks that could, in the absence of a safety net, have permanent 
repercussions. In this paper we explore the complementary question of FFW 
programs’ potential to reduce poverty and promote sustainable land use in the longer 
run through induced changes in investment patterns.  
 
FFW programs commonly aim to produce or maintain potentially valuable public 
goods necessary to stimulate productivity and thus income growth.  Among the most 
common projects are road building, reforestation, and the installation of terracing or 
irrigation.  In the abstract, public goods such as these are unambiguously good.  There 
is a danger, however, that such programs could discourage private soil and water 
conservation and crowd out private investment. How important are such effects and 
when are these effects small or large and when and how can they be reduced? How do 
                                                 
1  Stein Holden and Fitsum Hagos are professor and PhD-student in the Department of Economics and 
Social Sciences at the Agricultural University of Norway, Chistopher B.Barrett is associate professor in 
Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University.   
market characteristics, timing and design of FFW programs affect this? When, where 
and how can FFW programs more efficiently reduce poverty and promote more 
sustainable land management? The paper aims to answer these questions. 
 
Much recent empirical research has focused on the shorter-term targeting issue of 
whether FFW and related workfare programs efficiently target the poor (Dev 1995, 
Von Braun 1995, Webb 1995, Subbarao 1997, Clay et al. 1998, Devereux 1999, Jayne 
et al. 1999, Ravallion 1999, Teklu and Asefa 1999, Atwood et al. 2000, Gebremedhin 
and Swinton 2000, Haddad and Adato 2001, Jalan and Ravallion 2001).  Much less 
research has been focused on the longer-term effects of FFW. Yet the large share of 
hunger worldwide arises due to chronic deprivation and vulnerability, not short-term 
shocks (Speth 1993, Barrett 2002). Also most of the FFW programs in Ethiopia have 
long-term development goals and are formally distinguished from the disaster relief 
FFW programs (Aas and Mellemstrand 2002). It is therefore appropriate to evaluate 
these programs based on their long-term goals and not only on the basis of short-term 
targeting. In a case study in Tigray Aas and Mellemstrand (2002) found that the FFW 
recipients considered the long-term benefits of FFW as more important than the short-
term benefits of food provision.  
 
FFW programs may produce valuable public goods. For example, Von Braun et al. 
(1999) report multiplier effects of a FFW-built road in the Ethiopian lowlands.  Public 
provision of public goods may be socially desirable because private investment in soil 
and water conservation and tree planting may be well below socially optimal levels 
due to poverty and market imperfections (Holden, Shiferaw and Wik 1998, Holden 
and Shiferaw 2002, Holden and Yohannes 2002, Pender and Kerr 1998), tenure 
insecurity (Gebremedhin and Swinton 2000, Holden, Benin, Shiferaw and Pender 
2003), lack of technical knowledge and coordination problems across farms (Hagos 
and Holden 2002). There is, however, also a danger that FFW programs crowd out 
private investments (Gebremedhin and Swinton 2000).  
 
We analyze these issues using multiple methods. First, section II introduces a simple 
theoretical framework for understanding the analytically ambiguous effects of FFW 
programs on sustainable land use patterns.  We first present the basic intuition in a 
static framework to illustrate the selection, crowding out and targeting issues, before 
generalizing it to a dynamic model to illustrate the possible insurance and crowding in 
effects of FFW.  Section III then uses an applied, dynamic bio-economic farm 
household model applied to a less-favoured area in Ethiopia to investigate via 
numerical simulation how household welfare and land use patterns vary with changes 
in environmental and FFW program design parameters.  Section IV presents 
econometric evidence based on survey panel data from northern Ethiopia to assess the 
relationship between  FFW and private investment in conservation.  Section V 
discusses our findings and fleshes them out a bit with further empirical evidence.  
Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
We begin by developing a simple, static model of household labor allocation.  This 
lets us focus tightly on households’ choice of whether or not to participate in a FFW 
program and on the effects of FFW participation on labor allocation to farming 
activities.  In the second subsection, we then generalize the framework to explore the 
dynamics of household welfare, land use patterns and investment in soil conservation. 
 a. A simple, static model 
We begin with a simple, static model of household choice in an environment of 
missing markets for labor and land.  While we are ultimately concerned with the long-
term effects of FFW on land use patterns, this parsimonious introduction underscores 
the importance of initial resource endowments when factor markets work imperfectly 
or not at all.  Assume that the household maximizes utility, where utility is a function 
of consumption (c) and leisure (Le).  
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where pq is the price of output produced (the consumption good is taken as the 
numéraire), is a production function that is concave in each argument, with the 
marginal returns to each input increasing in the other inputs, L
)(•q
a is labor input in farm 
production, A  is the land endowment,2 FFWw  is the FFW wage rate,  is the 
amount of FFW labor, and T  is the total time endowment.  Because the model is 
static and the utility function satisfies the usual local nonsatiation assumption, the 
household consumes all its cash income (y). This model has no factor markets for land 
and oxen, only a market for FFW labor and a market for farm output.  The two 
decision variables in the model are labor in agricultural production and labor in FFW. 
The first order conditions imply 
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where w* is the household’s shadow wage rate, the marginal revenue product of labor 
in agriculture on the household’s farm.  The first order condition provides the 
selection mechanism that underpins household choice over whether or not it 
                                                 
2 One can equally think of A as the stock of quasi-fixed inputs, including not only land but also 
livestock and other productive farm assets.  
participates in the FFW program.  It participates only if the returns to farm work are 
as low as the FFW wage, in which case it will allocate labor so as to equalize the 
marginal returns to labor in agriculture and FFW.  This is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 1. 
 
As depicted in Figure 1, the marginal returns to agricultural labor are higher for the 
relatively land-rich household than for the land-poor household, holding all other 
endowments constant.  The household with more land will allocate D amount of its 
labor to agriculture and not participate in the FFW program. Its shadow wage is 
> . The land-poor household, by contrast, faces a more rapid reduction in the 
marginal returns to its agricultural labor. Without access to FFW it would have a 
shadow wage of 
*w FFWw
w* < . It will therefore choose to participate in FFW up to the 
point where the marginal returns to agricultural labor just equal . This illustrates 
the idea of self-selection into FFW by land-poor households.  
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    Figure 1. Time allocation of land-poor vs. land-rich households  
 The land-poor household will allocate C-A amount of labor to FFW. Without access 
to FFW it would allocate B amount of labor to agriculture. The availability of FFW 
employment crowds out B-A amount of labor from agriculture and C-B amount of 
labor from leisure. This illustrates the first potential complication of FFW – and the 
key one for the purposes of this paper – it may crowd out other productive activities 
that require household labor. Similarly, households with relatively greater 
endowments of other productive resources that increase the marginal productivity of 
agricultural labor, such as livestock and education, also achieve higher marginal 
returns to their labour and therefore are less likely to choose to participate in FFW 
programs if the  is sufficiently low.  FFWw
 
The household’s labor endowment figures prominently in the calculus of FFW 
participation and in the consequences of FFW participation for private labor 
allocation patterns.  We illustrate this in Figure 2. T1 is the time endowment of a 
relatively labor-poor household (holding all other endowments constant) and T2 is the 
labor endowment for a labor-rich household. Since, by assumption, the two 
households have the same amount of land and the same preferences, they face the 
same marginal return to agricultural labor and marginal rate of substitution schedules. 
The difference in labor endowments thus induces the labor-rich household to allocate 
more labor to both farming and leisure because the marginal return to its agricultural 
labor is lower than that of the labor-poor household. If FFW employment is offered at 
, only the labor-rich household will self-select into FFW.  This illustrates a 
second prospective shortcoming of FFW: it is not a good policy instrument for 
assisting labor-poor households, such as those affected by disease or injury.  
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    Figure 2. Time allocation for labor-rich vs. labor-poor households 
 
The preceding analyses varied only one asset endowment at a time.  In reality, all vary 
simultaneously.  But the intuition laid out simply above underscores how FFW 
participation and prospective crowding out of on-farm labor vary across the 
household wealth distribution according to land/labor ratios.  As Barrett and Clay 
(2003) emphasize and illustrate using nationally representative data from Ethiopia, a 
poor household with relatively little land but proportionately less labor may have a 
higher shadow wage than a richer household with a greater land endowment but 
proportionately more labor available.  In the presence of incomplete factor markets, 
shadow wages therefore need not increase with land or livestock endowments, or with 
wealth or income more broadly, and the efficacy of FFW self-targeting breaks down.  
The wealthy may become as likely as the poor to participate in FFW programs. This 
may also be due to the fact that the “FFW wage” has been set too high in Ethiopia and 
is higher than the opportunity cost of time of most households.  
 Household willingness to participate in FFW programs varies according to climatic 
conditions because of climate’s impact on agricultural labor productivity.  If we 
generalize the production function to condition output on rainfall, r, )|,( rALaq , with 
both output and the marginal productivity of labor and land increasing in rainfall, then 
we can easily see how drought affects household demand for FFW. We assume the 
FFW real wage ( ) remains the same, a food ration that is constant across rainfall 
regimes. But due to covariate production risk and imperfect integration of rural output 
markets into broader national and international food markets, the food price, p
FFWw
q, 
moves inversely with rainfall.  Food prices are typically higher in drought years than 
in normal years.  As a consequence of constant physical rations but higher nominal 
food prices, the nominal FFW wage increases in drought years.  At the margin, this 
induces increased FFW program participation, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The impact of drought on labor productivity and FFW participation. 
 
We assume that Figure 3 represents a land-rich household that does not demand FFW 
in normal years because its shadow wage, w*, is higher than the FFW wage, wFFW, in 
normal years. However, the marginal return to agricultural labor falls in a drought 
year.  This effect alone is sufficient for the household to demand C-B amount of FFW 
employment were the nominal FFW wage held constant.  But because the price of 
food also increases in the drought year, the increase in the FFW wage to  
further increases household demand for FFW employment.  
FFW
Dw
 
FFW programs do not have unlimited budgets, however, so increased demand for 
program participation commonly overwhelms programs in drought years, forcing 
rationing of FFW employment. In some cases, rationing is effected through 
unemployment, in others through underemployment relative to an unbounded 
equilibrium.  In Figure 3 we have assumed that the FFW program rations employment 
equitably across all prospective participants, capping access to FFW at D-A amount 
of labor.  This necessarily causes households to increase their on-farm labor allocation 
relative to what would occur if the FFW program budget did not constrain FFW 
employment.  In Figure 3, we show the special case in which employment rationing 
causes the household’s (nominal) shadow wage to be the same in the drought year as 
in the normal year.  The all-too-common problem of employment rationing illustrates 
a third prospective weakness of FFW. It may not be an effective instrument for self-
targeting of the poor in drought years – or in the face of other covariate shocks to 
labor productivity in the region – because the self-selection mechanism breaks down 
in the face of excess demand for program participation unless the food wage rate is 
adjusted down, which is ethically problematic and contravenes the principles of most 
of the humanitarian agencies that commonly administer FFW programs.  
 b. A dynamic extension 
We now generalize the simple model above to account for the dynamics of investment 
in soil conservation structures.  This requires three key modifications to the static 
model of the previous subsection.  First, in the dynamic model the household no 
longer consumes all its income today so long as there is some prospect of being alive 
tomorrow.  Instead, the household has to allocate current income between 
consumption and investment so as to equalize its marginal utility of consumption 
across periods.  Second, while in the static model, households will only devote labor 
to activities that generate current income, in a dynamic model, they might invest labor 
in activities that generate income only with a lag.  We therefore now break household 
agricultural labor into two distinct activities: field labor that generates income in the 
current period and conservation labor spent improving the land so as to increase 
future productivity and income.3  We model soil conservation investments this way 
because natural resources investments in African agriculture tend to be very labor-
intensive (Barrett , Place and Aboud 2002). This leads directly to the third basic 
difference from the static model: effective land quantity is now a state variable.  The 
initial stock of land evolves in response to soil and water conservation investments 
and natural degradation due to erosion and nutrient depletion.  Farmers understand 
this and make labor allocation decisions accordingly. 
 
Assume the household’s utility is intertemporally separable.  Then the household’s 
infinite period dynamic optimization problem can be represented by the following 
                                                 
3 One could equally understand land dynamics as depending on labor allocation through labor-intensive 
land clearing at the extensive margin (Reardon and Barrett 2001).  In the Ethiopian context on which 
we focus in the empirical sections of this paper, however, soil and water conservation is the more 
germane link, so we focus on that interpretation for the remainder of the paper.  
Bellman’s equation, in which β represents the household’s discount rate, Lc is the 
amount of labor allocated to constructing or maintaining soil conservation structures,  
δA and δT are endogenous depreciation rates for land and labor stocks, respectively, z 
is the stock of productive public goods, and I is net investment in conservation units: 
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We include the public good, z, because the typical justification for FFW programs is 
that they couple a short-term safety net for vulnerable subpopulations with investment 
in valuable public goods – roads, reforestation, irrigation, soil and water conservation 
structures – that increase future productivity.  The short-term safety net provides an 
income floor to insure against insufficient current consumption, thereby guarding 
against loss of household labor due to illness or injury associated with under-nutrition, 
through the δT human capital depreciation function.4  As modeled here, the public 
good may affect the rate of depreciation of land (e.g., through reforestation projects 
                                                 
4 In a more general specification, one might allow for the sale of quasi-fixed assets.  FFW could then  
reduce disinvestment in valuable productive assets, as commonly occurs in distress sales of land or 
livestock.  Since we treat land and livestock as nontradable, we omit the distress sale mitigation effect 
from the present model.  Similarly, FFW could permit continued investment in other key assets, such as 
children’s education.  Given low school enrollment rates in rural Ethiopia, we likewise omit the 
possibility of educational investments and thus of FFW stemming the withdrawal of children from 
school during times of stress.  Finally, one could allow the discount rate, β, to be an endogenous 
function of current consumption (reflecting how survival probabilities vary with consumption levels), 
with the effect that FFW wage receipts limit households’ discounting of future consumption, thereby 
encouraging greater investment in conservation structures.  Although we omit them from the formal 
model in this section for reasons of parsimony, these phenomena nonetheless merit attention in 
empirical work. 
that reduce erosion or feeder road construction projects that accelerate erosion5), the 
productivity of conservation labor in improving land quality (e.g., due to terracing or 
reforestation of public lands on hilltops that increases the productivity of private 
terracing down-slope), or direct agricultural productivity (e.g., through small-scale 
irrigation projects).6    
 
The laws of motion for the state variables A and T each depend on endogenous 
depreciation rates.  Land quality depreciates with increased harvests that extract more 
soil nutrients and with higher rates of erosion (part of the z vector), while land quality 
increases with time spent working on conservation structures and with public goods 
that stem erosion (e.g., reforestation or terracing).  The stock of labor available to the 
household is increasing in energy consumption (c) and decreasing in energy 
expenditure (equivalently, increasing in leisure, Le).  Given initial values A0 and T0 
and exogenous public goods stock z0, the household then solves the current value 
Hamiltonian associated with the above problem.   
 
This specification reveals the inherent ambiguity of FFW programs’ effect on land 
quality.  If the household chooses to participate, FFW program participation will 
reduce time allocated to both on-farm labor and leisure, as illustrated in the static 
framework of the previous subsection.  Because households rationally equalize the 
returns to field and conservation labor – the two forms of on-farm labor we consider – 
so as to equalize the marginal utility of current and future consumption, FFW 
participation will induce a reduction in labor allocated to soil and water conservation, 
                                                 
5 Giambelluca et al.(2002) find in hilly, smallholder regions of northern Thailand that unpaved roads 
are, by far, the primary source of water runoff and erosion, having far greater adverse effects on soil 
loss and siltation of downstream irrigation than forest clearing due to shifting cultivation. 
6 One might also want to permit prices to be a function of z so as to capture the effect of road building 
or maintenance projects on marketing transactions costs.  We leave this extension for future work.   
ceteris paribus. This can reduce land quality and hurt future productivity.  Similarly, 
if the reduction in leisure due to FFW participation outweighs the increase in current 
consumption – as has been shown to happen in some FFW programs, where women 
especially have been known to increase energy expenditure by more than the marginal 
increase in energy intake they enjoy (Barrett, Holden and Clay forthcoming) – then 
there may be some degradation of household labor capacity, and thus of future 
earnings potential.7   
 
These possible adverse effects may be dampened or even dwarfed by the potentially 
salutary effects of FFW on land quality through avoidance of lost labor time due to 
under-nutrition, through reduced pressure on the land due to reduced current 
cultivation (i.e., the crowding out of current field labor can reduce rates of soil 
nutrient harvest), and via investment in public goods, z.  Whether the negative or 
positive land quality effects of FFW dominate will depend on local biophysical and 
economic environmental conditions and on the design of the FFW program, as 
Section IV illustrates through simulation modeling techniques.   
 
 
III. Simulations with a dynamic bio-economic model 
The bio-economic model presented here is a dynamic, nonseparable household model 
that simultaneously integrates economic optimization in production and consumption 
with inter-temporal environmental feedbacks, allowing for nonlinearities in 
constraints as well as in the objective function. The model also incorporates risk 
averse behavior through a constant partial relative risk aversion utility function, 
                                                 
7 One sometimes hears claims that FFW programs also create dependency or retard innovative 
behaviour.  We know of no strong empirical evidence of such effects, however, and they fall outside 
the scope of the present modelling effort.  
production risk due to drought, and downside risk aversion to taking credit for 
fertilizer. Drought also affects prices for crops and livestock and price expectations 
and these have follow-on effects on household production and welfare. The model has 
been calibrated and aggregated to resemble observed patterns of northern Ethiopian 
household interactions through their participation in imperfect factor and output 
markets. We refer interested readers to Holden and Shiferaw (in press), Holden, 
Benin, Shiferaw and Pender (2003), Holden, Shiferaw and Pender (forthcoming) for 
more details and applications of the bioeconomic model employed in this section.  
 
The models endogenize land degradation due to soil erosion and nutrient depletion. 
The availability of biophysical data from conservation experiments in the study area 
allows us to estimate erosion rates as well as crop productivity responses on different 
soils. The model also integrates crop and livestock interactions. Crop choice, building 
or removal of conservation structures on different types of land, fertilizer use, and 
manure use are endogenous decisions that affect the rate of land degradation. These 
decisions affect soil erosion and nutrient depletion rates that, once again, determine 
crop productivity in later years. 
 
We want to assess the impact of new FFW programs in Andit Tid that aim to enhance 
food security through provision of seasonal employment at a low wage rate paid in 
kind, in the form of food.  In what follows, we study the impact of FFW under three 
distinct scenarios: (a) when employment is provided outside agriculture and (b) when 
employment is provided for conservation investment within agriculture.  In the first 
two scenarios, we assume that access to off-farm employment is constrained (i.e., 
                                                 
 
households do not face infinitely elastic labor demand) and that conservation 
investment does not reduce initial yields. Scenario (c) is like scenario (b), but with 
unconstrained access to off-farm employment and with conservation investment 
reducing initial yields (both these changes reduce incentives for farm production and 
conservation investment). In cases (b) and (c) we assume that the investment is taking 
place on the FFW participant households’ farms. In all cases the “wage rate” in FFW 
is 3 kg wheat per day of work, the standard rate used in FFW programs in Ethiopia.  
 
One oft-heard criticism is that FFW will undermine participants’ incentives to 
produce their own food and to take care of their own farms, partly because FFW 
activities compete for scarce time with households’ private farming activities. FFW 
advocates counter that FFW provided outside the main agricultural season stems such 
competition, enabling FFW investments and income to be largely additional to the 
household’s private earnings and investment patterns. However, FFW may still 
compete with households’ own conservation activities, as these activities are typically 
carried out in the slack agricultural season. In the site for which we developed this 
model, Andit Tid in northern Ethiopia, there are two growing seasons. It is most 
relevant to provide FFW after the short rains, that is in the period March to May, 
during which time households indeed undertake most of their soil and water 
conservation investments through labor intensive work on structures on-farm.  
 
In our first simulation (scenario (a)), we study the impact of FFW not used for 
conservation, when households have constrained access to the labor market, and 
conservation technologies do not reduce initial yields. We see from the 10 graphs that 
comprise Figure 4 that over the whole ten year horizon we simulate, FFW increases  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
Et
hi
op
ia
n 
Bi
rr
Without FFW
With FFW
Income per capita
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
Et
hi
op
ia
n 
Bi
rr
Without FFW
With FFW
Net food surplus/deficit in normal year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
70
80
90
100
110
120
To
ns
/fa
rm
 &
 y
ea
r
Without FFW
With FFW
Total soil erosion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
-2200
-2000
-1800
-1600
-1400
-1200
-1000
-800
Et
hi
op
ia
n 
Bi
rr
Without FFW
With FFW
Food deficit in drought year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
M
an
da
ys
/y
ea
r
Without FFW
With FFW
Conservation labour
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 fa
rm
 s
iz
e
Without FFW
With FFW
Proportion of land conserved
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
380
390
400
410
420
430
440
450
460
M
an
da
ys
/y
ea
r
Without FFW
With FFW
Farm labour use
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
H
ec
ta
re
s/
fa
rm
Without FFW
With FFW
Cultivated area
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
Sh
ar
e 
of
 p
ov
er
ty
 li
ne
 in
co
m
e
Without FFW
With FFW
Total bad year loss
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
M
an
da
ys
/y
ea
r
Without FFW
With FFW
Total leisure time
 
Figure 4. The impact of introducing FFW when FFW is not used for conservation, labor 
market access is constrained  and land conservation does not reduce initial yields 
 
income per capita compared to the base case model in which households lack access 
to FFW employment. We also see that own food production is reduced in normal as 
well as in drought years for households with access to FFW.  This occurs because 
households with access to FFW reduce farm labor use, including soil conservation 
labor. Reduced labor allocation to construction and maintenance of soil conservation 
structures means that a smaller proportion of the farm is conserved and total soil 
erosion increases among households with access to FFW. Total leisure time is 
reduced for households with access to FFW, indicating that FFW has substituted not 
only for farm labour but also for leisure time.  This presumably increases food energy 
intake requirements, offsetting at least part of the increased income and consumption.  
Scenario (a) thus demonstrates the clear costs of providing FFW in an environment 
and in a fashion in which it may reduce incentives for own food production and 
conservation, thereby undercutting future productivity and increasing the likelihood 
that participant households will need future assistance as well.  
 
In scenario (b), we only change the allocation of FFW labor, now assuming it to be 
applied to conservation on participating households’ farms, again under the twin 
assumptions of constrained labor market access and no initial yield reduction due to 
conservation investments. The results are presented in Figure 5. Household income 
per capita once again increases for FFW participant households.  But because FFW 
labor no longer crowds out on-farm conservation labor, FFW stimulates land 
conservation and thus leads to less soil erosion, although the long-term impact on 
household food production is relatively modest. 
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Figure 5. The impact of FFW when FFW is used for land conservation, labor market 
access is constrained and conservation does not reduce initial yields 
In scenario (c), we alter two of the initial assumptions in order to study the impact of 
FFW used for on-farm conservation when households have unconstrained access to 
the labor market (i.e., they enjoy better non-farm employment opportunities than 
previously assumed) and conservation technologies reduce initial yields, thereby 
dampening incentives to conserve land. Figure 6 reports the results of the scenario (c) 
model simulations.  
 
As always, household income per capita increases for households that choose to 
participate in the FFW program, although the gains are less than when access to the 
labour market was constrained because FFW no longer resolves a structural deficit in 
labor demand.  FFW participation in an environment in which cash wage employment 
is available implies that the FFW payment (3 kg wheat per day) is higher than the 
cash wage prevailing on the local labor market. As a consequence, FFW substitutes 
for other off-farm work, causing a reallocation of labor within the economy.  
 
On the other hand, FFW stimulates own food production and reduces food deficits in 
normal as well as drought years, and particularly so towards the end of the ten year 
period for which the models have been run. This arises largely because FFW is used 
for land conservation, which makes farm production more sustainable. Without FFW 
households, do not invest in conservation at all because conservation reduces initial 
yields and because they have alternative off-farm employment opportunities.  This 
scenario illustrates how FFW can help poor households overcome borrowing 
constraints that restrict costly investment.  The food provided by FFW enables 
households to reallocate labor from current on-farm production without forcing them 
to make an excessive sacrifice in terms of current consumption.  Indeed, the core  
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Figure 6. Effects of FFW when conservation reduces initial yields and access to 
off-farm employment is unconstrained 
point of this paper is that these sorts of desirable crowding-in effects only emerge 
under particular combinations of FFW program design and the underlying biophysical 
and economic environment. 
 
We see that the effects of FFW on food production and conservation of land can differ 
greatly depending on how and for what activities FFW is used, on the characteristics 
of the labor market, and on the impact of conservation technologies on short-term 
yields. We also see that even a daily FFW wage of 3 kg wheat may be too high in 
some places of northern Ethiopia.  Better poverty targeting and greater coverage may 
be achieved with less displacement of pre-existing employment patterns by lowering 
the rate to 2 or 2.5 kg wheat per day of work, although this depends on the wheat 
price as well.  
 
We also run simulations with a reduced FFW wage rate. We found that households 
choose to participate in FFW programs at wages as low as 1.1 kg wheat per day 
(down from the 3 kg/day baseline commonly used in Ethiopian FFW programs). The 
level of soil conservation investment was not reduced significantly when the wage 
was reduced from 3 kg to 2 kg wheat. If the main objective of long-term oriented 
FFW programs is to promote land conservation and the budget for this is limited it 
would be possible to expand total land conservation by reducing the FFW wage. This 
may also improve the self-selection of the poorer households, thereby allowing 
limited funds to reach more households.   
 
The land use effects of FFW projects have not been well studied.  The simulation 
results reported in this section underscore that when FFW competes with labor used 
for conservation, FFW may reduce incentives to conserve land, at least where such 
incentives exist without intervention. On the other hand, FFW may be used to 
stimulate conservation when there are insufficient incentives to conserve land, as in 
the case when initial yields fall with the construction of soil conservation structures. 
This illustrates that great care has to be taken when such programs are designed if 
they are to overcome private investment disincentive effects and not to crowd out 
private investment in soil conservation. Good knowledge about local farming systems, 
local market characteristics and prices, and the distribution of resources and welfare, 
are needed to avoid design failures. Lack of such knowledge by many past FFW 
program managers likely helps explain mixed past experience with such programs 
(Barrett, Holden and Clay, forthcoming). 
 
IV. Econometric evidence from northern Ethiopia 
This section reports econometric findings based on data from a survey covering 400 
households in 16 communities in the highlands of Tigray. This is a sub-sample of the 
stratified random sample of communities in the IFPRI-ILRI community survey (ref.). 
The sub-sample of 16 communities was strategically chosen to include four 
communities from each of the four zones in Tigray, to have eight communities with 
low population density and eight with low population density, to have eight with good 
market access and eight with poor market access, and to include three communities 
with irrigation projects.  The households were surveyed in 1998 and 2001. We 
obtained complete data for both years for 323 households that are included in this 
analysis.  
 
FFW is an important policy instrument used in northern Ethiopia in an effort to 
improve food security and promote sustainable development. Fifty-seven percent of 
our sample households participated in FFW projects, supplying an average of 45 labor 
man-days in 2000, with greater participation in remote areas with poor market access. 
 
a) FFW participation 
Analysis of FFW participation focuses on the discrete decision to participate in the 
FFW program.  Recall from section IIa that a household’s probability of self-selection 
into FFW programs is expected to increase in household labor supply.  Indeed, the 
regression estimates of the probit equation show that male and female labor 
availability within the household are the best predictors of FFW participation, both in 
the sense of having the strongest marginal effect and the most statistically significant 
effect on program participation.  Households with secondary school education – who 
are thus more likely to hold remunerative off-farm employment at a wage rate in 
excess of the FFW wage – are less likely to participate.  These findings confirm basic 
intuition about household labor allocation patterns.  Old age also tends to be 
correlated with lower probability of participation. We also find economically and 
statistically significant differences between the 16 different communities.  
 
b)  Crowding out or crowding in effects of FFW? 
In the first round survey in 1998, 21% of the households stated that FFW participation 
gave them less time to look after their farm and animals, while only one percent stated 
that it gave them more time to look after their farm and animals (Hagos and Holden 
1998). Furthermore, 43% stated that FFW reduced their need to produce own food, 
while only four percent stated that it made them able to invest more on their own 
farms.  This suggests that FFW may indeed have some of the crowding-out effects on 
farm labor and production posited in the preceding sections.  On the other hand, the 
insurance function played by FFW may reduce the subjective discount rates and 
increase the planning horizon of poor people (Holden et al. 1998; Holden and  
Table 1. Probit model for FFW participation 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
             |               Robust 
     ffwmark |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       hhage |  -.0109002   .0063565    -1.71   0.086    -.0233587    .0015584 
       hhsex |  -.1499885   .3506377    -0.43   0.669    -.8372258    .5372489 
       hhedu |   .1666104   .1572888     1.06   0.289      -.14167    .4748909 
     hhskill |  -.0220808   .1955269    -0.11   0.910    -.4053066    .3611449 
    lncwrati |   .3730377   .2648434     1.41   0.159    -.1460458    .8921211 
       lnfem |   1.043379   .3823081     2.73   0.006     .2940692    1.792689 
      lnmale |   .5412297   .2548529     2.12   0.034     .0417272    1.040732 
     lnprime |  -.0673437   .2345154    -0.29   0.774    -.5269855    .3922981 
    lnsecond |  -.6196708   .2040153    -3.04   0.002    -1.019534   -.2198081 
    lnownhol |   .1488218   .2003874     0.74   0.458    -.2439304    .5415739 
    lnoxen98 |   .2215104   .2516461     0.88   0.379    -.2717069    .7147276 
     lntlu98 |  -.1631953   .1932283    -0.84   0.398    -.5419158    .2155252 
 _Ivillage_2 |  -.1671024   .0977553    -1.71   0.087    -.3586993    .0244945 
 _Ivillage_3 |   .0536279   .0562779     0.95   0.341    -.0566747    .1639305 
 _Ivillage_4 |  -1.410307   .1406173   -10.03   0.000    -1.685912   -1.134702 
 _Ivillage_5 |   .1073146   .0933135     1.15   0.250    -.0755766    .2902058 
 _Ivillage_6 |   .3406326   .0794419     4.29   0.000     .1849293    .4963358 
 _Ivillage_7 |  -.6095858    .067225    -9.07   0.000    -.7413444   -.4778272 
 _Ivillage_8 |   .0546807   .1015686     0.54   0.590    -.1443901    .2537515 
 _Ivillage_9 |   .2101829   .1883417     1.12   0.264      -.15896    .5793258 
_Ivillage_10 |   .5645241   .1328074     4.25   0.000     .3042264    .8248218 
_Ivillage_11 |   .3200702   .1349391     2.37   0.018     .0555945    .5845459 
_Ivillage_12 |   .4065213   .1078518     3.77   0.000     .1951358    .6179069 
_Ivillage_13 |   -.997943   .1239139    -8.05   0.000     -1.24081   -.7550763 
_Ivillage_14 |  -.4822097   .1110757    -4.34   0.000     -.699914   -.2645053 
_Ivillage_15 |  -.1347221   .0872382    -1.54   0.123    -.3057058    .0362616 
_Ivillage_16 |  -1.376176    .113321   -12.14   0.000    -1.598281   -1.154071 
       _cons |  -.5475462   .7099908    -0.77   0.441    -1.939103    .8440103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs. =327, Log likelihood = -178.422, Pseudo R2 = 0.1865 
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on village) 
 
Shiferaw 2002).   Lower discount rates and longer planning horizons increase the 
attractiveness of investment relative to current consumption and would thereby be 
expected to have the opposite, crowding-in effect on private soil conservation 
investment behaviour. 
 
Table 2 enumerates the various FFW activities in which sample households 
participated. As can be seen, much FFW activity in Tigray has focused on soil and 
water conservation. Initially, much of these activities were carried out on communal 
land; but in the second half of the 1990s these activities also expanded into the private 
land holdings. These investments were also complemented by mass mobilization of 
labor at community level. Mass mobilization has been an annual activity in Tigray for 
many years. Each able-bodied adult person has to contribute 20 days of work to the 
community without any direct payment. This may be seen as a publicly organized 
collective action or a labor tax that is invested within the local community. The local 
community also decides on where to allocate the mobilized labor. Table 3 presents the 
types of activities households participated in through mass mobilization in 1997. 
 
Table 2. Types of food-for-work activities in which households have participated  
FFW activities in which 
households have participated  
Zone All 
 Central Eastern Southern Western  
Stone terrace construction 35 8 20 6 18 
Soil bund construction 4 4 15 0 6 
Bench terraces construction 1 0 0 7 2 
Check dam construction 6 5 0 1 3 
Dam construction 14 12 48 15 22 
Gully control 6 4 0 0 3 
River diversion 0 2 0 0 1 
Tree planting 2 5 3 4 4 
Soil and water conservation 18 8 3 7 9 
Road construction 8 14 7 6 9 
School construction 1 4 1 0 2 
Other house construction 3 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Types of mass mobilization activities during last year (1997) 
Types of Activities       (% Zone Average 
 Central Eastern Southern Western  
Conservation on communal land 62 51 48 27 47 
Conservation on private land 28 17 41 14 25 
Road construction 0 0 4 1 1 
Other work 3 19 14 2 10 
All activities 93 87 107 44 83 
 
 
The survey also asked households what assistance they considered important in order 
to be able to reduce land degradation in their area. Their responses are summarized in 
Table 4.  Respondents universally considered technical assistance most important, 
although many – especially in the western zone – also emphasized the importance of 
labor mobilization and conflict resolution as well. There is clearly a need to 
coordinate conservation activities across farms and considerable technical skills are 
required to design and fit the alternative conservation technologies into the landscape.  
This adds an additional rationale – beyond what we have discussed in the theoretical 
and applied models so far - for public intervention to promote land conservation on 
private land. FFW may in this connection also be beneficial as a complementary 
instrument to mass mobilization to increase investment on privately operated land. It 
may also reduce the negative effect on the human capital caused by the labor mass 
mobilization. The result of this may crowding in rather than crowding out of private 
investment due to the demonstration, coordination, labor mobilization and conflict 
resolution effects. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Types of assistance needed to reduce the land degradation problem  
Type of Assistance Zone Average (%) 
 Central Eastern Southern Western  
Technical assistance and labor 
mobilization 
60 58 45 59 56 
Technical assistance 23 28 46 8 26 
Technical assistance and 
conflict resolution 
14 10 4 31 15 
Technical assistance and other 
assistance 
0 1 1 0 1 
Conflict resolution and labor 
mobilization 
1 0 0 1 1 
Conflict resolution and other 
assistance 
1 0 0 0 0 
Labor mobilization 1 1 2 1 1 
Other assistance 0 0 1 0 0 
No assistance 0 2 1 0 1 
 
How are public and private investments distributed across farm plots? Table 5 
presents the distribution of public and private investment in soil bunds and stone 
terraces at farm plot level.  Roughly half of the plots with privately-built stone 
terraces also had public conservation investment, while only about one-quarter of the 
plots on which there had been public conservation investments had privately-built 
stone terraces.  These patterns were roughly similar for soil bunds. These data provide 
an uncommon opportunity to analyze the determinants of private investment in 
conservation at plot level, in particular the effect of public conservation investments 
through FFW and other labor mobilization schemes on private soil conservation 
investments (Hagos and Holden 2003).      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Role of public and private conservation investments 
 
Public-led conservation investment  
Private investment Yes No 
Number plots with stone terraces 
Yes 173 174 
No 527 650 
Number plots with soil bunds 
Yes 106 68 
No 594 756 
Intensity of stone terraces 
Yes 71.540 70.953 
No 5.393 0.000 
Intensity of soil bunds 
Yes 111.308 93.844 
No 17.799 0.000 
Intensity of conservation technologies is measured in meters on structure per ha of land. Yes and No in 
the rows indicate whether there are private investments or not on the plots, and similarly for public 
investments in the Yes and No columns. 
 
Hagos and Holden (2003) find that public investment at plot level was positively 
correlated with private investment in conservation through both soil bunds and stone 
terraces. Such positive correlation was found both for the probability of private plot 
level conservation and the level of plot level private conservation investment. In that 
analysis, we controlled for a large number of soil and plot characteristics, household 
characteristics, village and market characteristics. This seems to be strong evidence of 
public conservation investments crowding in private investment in conservation.  The 
explanation seems to be the need for technical support (demonstration effect), 
coordination of such efforts across farms, labor mobilization and conflict resolution.  
These effects go beyond what we have discussed in our theoretical and applied 
models earlier in this paper. However, the combination of FFW and mass 
mobilization may reduce the labor depreciation cost of mass mobilization and thus 
facilitate further private conservation efforts. This is also in line with the argument 
that FFW may provide insurance and reduce the severity of cash constraints and thus 
private discount rates. 
 
V. Discussion 
FFW projects have been implemented for short-term relief purposes as well as long-
term development purposes in Ethiopia and other low-income countries. There may 
be tradeoffs between the short-term assistance and long-term investment objectives of 
FFW (Gebremedhin and Swinton 1999). It may be that one can basically have the 
safety net effects that operate through the law of motion on labor, by maintaining 
human nutrition and health, or one can enjoy productive public goods investments, 
but not both.  
 
The theoretical and empirical findings in this paper reinforce existing evidence that 
FFW may not be a particularly efficient instrument for short-term targeting of the 
poorest of the poor, a group that often fails to benefit from FFW because they lack the 
labor power needed in order to participate. Indeed, we found that labor rich 
households were more likely to participate in FFW in Tigray. However, FFW is 
typically implemented in areas where almost all households are poor and in need of 
support, particularly in drought years, when FFW wages tend to increase in real terms 
relative to market wages (due to increased food prices).  As a consequence, unless 
FFW implementing agencies are willing to reduce FFW wages in times of drought, 
self-targeting of the poorest breaks down further as demand for FFW participation 
increases.   
 
In this paper we have focused more on the potential of FFW to stimulate investment 
in public goods that may increase future productivity. We use a simple theoretical 
model to lay out the basic analytics of the ambiguous effects of FFW programs on 
private investment in soil conservation measures, then illustrate these results using 
both an applied bioeconomic model and econometric analysis of panel data from 
northern Ethiopia.  Our results underscore that the success of FFW investments in 
stimulating soil conservation, sustainable agricultural productivity increases, and 
income growth depends crucially on several key conditioning factors, including 
careful identification of relevant investment projects (a process that typically requires 
substantive local participation) and of appropriate technology design, local 
involvement in implementation and maintenance of investments after the project, 
clear specification of property rights to the investments, implementation only where 
private capacity or willingness to invest are limited, and timing of projects to 
minimize labor crowding out effects. 
 
There are, unfortunately, many cases of past FFW projects that did not meet these 
requirements. For example, the top-down implementation of FFW conservation 
investments during the 1980s in Ethiopia did not involve local people in planning or 
organization. Farm households themselves had no real influence over the choice of 
conservation technology or how it was fit into the landscape on their farms. This 
caused many to reject the technologies; many were found to have partly or fully 
removed these structures from their farms (Shiferaw and Holden 1998).  The NGOs 
that implement FFW projects typically are humanitarian agencies that do not have the 
technical skills needed to undertake substantive investment projects right (although 
there are certainly wonderful examples of well-conceived and well-executed projects).   
 
Similarly, Smith and Little (2002, p.6) report on a serious bush encroachment 
problem in the Il Chamus areas of Baringo District.  The problem arises from the 
introduction of Prosopis spp. (mesquite in North America) as part of a mid-1980s 
FFW reforestation project intended to create fuelwood.  The problem is that prosopis 
proliferates quickly, crowds out grasses, and is somewhat toxic for the small 
ruminants (goats, sheep) on which the Il Chamus agropastoralists depend.  The seed 
pods of the prosopis closely resemble a variety of acacia pod, a common livestock 
feed, so keeping livestock away from prosopis is difficult, but it hurts their teeth and 
gastrointestinal systems.  The tree is deemed a serious nuisance by locals and in their 
view the reforestation effort has actually reduced available grazing area and livestock 
productivity in the area over the long-term.  Smith and Little conclude that this project 
was "an unmitigated disaster for the [Ng'ambo] community and consequently they are 
now largely resistant to forestry interventions."   
 
By contrast, more recent FFW projects in Tigray seem to be better designed, and to 
involve local  people more than many FFW projects in other parts of Ethiopia. For 
example, Aas and Mellestrand (2002) found that the local people perceived the long-
term effects of the FFW projects in Eastern Tigray to be more important than the 
short-term food benefits they got from these projects. Our analysis of data from 16 
communities in Tigray also showed that the crowding in effects of FFW on 
investment in land conservation were stronger than the crowding out effects. FFW 
projects may enable farm households to become more forward-looking due to their 
insurance, liquidity and income effects, leading to longer-lasting benefits than are 
achieved through poorly targeted transfers.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Market imperfections are necessary but not sufficient condition to defend the use of 
FFW projects for short-term relief and/or for promotion of long-term development. 
Market imperfections may also prevent FFW projects from being efficiently targeted 
to the poor and effective in stimulating investment. This paper offers a combined 
theoretical, simulation and econometric exploration of the conditions under which 
FFW can be effective in reaching the poorest target subpopulations and in stimulating 
investment in soil conservation structures that are essential to sustainable agricultural 
productivity and income growth in rural Ethiopia.   
 
How good are FFW projects at targeting the poor and  how can targeting of the poor 
with FFW be improved? FFW projects tend to favor labor-rich households and are not 
designed to reach the poorest of the poor. The opportunity cost of labor and the “FFW 
wage” jointly determine whether households demand FFW employment. It is possible 
that the FFW wage has been set too high in Ethiopia to make the self-selection 
mechanism efficient.  A central point of our analysis, however, is that structural 
failures in rural factor markets account for much of the apparent mistargeting, 
irrespective of the prevailing FFW wage. 
 
Most of the FFW projects in Ethiopia have had long-term development, rather than 
short-term relief, as their primary goal. One should therefore guard against evaluating 
these programs solely on the basis of their short-term poverty-targeting efficacy. It is 
not likely that the best investment projects are located at the same places as the most 
needy households are located. There may therefore be tradeoffs between the long-
term and short-term objectives.  
 FFW induced investments may be socially beneficial where private investments are 
below socially optimal investment levels. This may be due to the public good nature 
of the investments (e.g. infrastructure), poverty and liquidity constraints, risk (e.g. 
tenure insecurity) and intertemporal market imperfections, lack of technical skills and 
the need for collective action to coordinate investments across farms. FFW projects 
may provide insurance and relax cash constraints and thus lower the discount rates of 
poor people and make them more forward looking and more able and willing to 
invest.  But careful identification of investment projects is crucial for the success of 
FFW investment projects. Involvement of the local people in identification, 
implementation, and maintenance of the FFW public good investments is very 
important if de novo FFW investment is to prove durable and if it is not to crowd out 
private investment.  
  
Most of this paper has focused on how best to minimize crowding out effects and how 
best to maximize crowding in effects on private investment in soil conservation.  
There seem to be several key, basic rules of thumb one can follow.  First, FFW 
investments need to timed so as to minimize competition with other constructive 
activities and when the opportunity cost of labor is low for poor households who are 
the primary intended beneficiaries of the long-term investments.  Second, if FFW 
projects can protect human capital in the face of idiosyncratic (e.g., farm-specific 
yield) shocks, then its short and long-term productivity may be enhanced. Likewise, if 
FFW projects can enhance land productivity through investment in conservation and 
more productive activities, like planting of perennials, this will also increase the 
future returns to labor and other inputs and therefore also stimulate their use. As we 
illustrated with simulations from a farm-level bioeconomic model and with 
econometric results from Tigray in northern Ethiopia, FFW can crowd in private 
investments in soil conservation and improve the welfare of people in the longer term. 
It is, however, a skill and knowledge demanding task to design and implement 
efficient FFW programs. There is considerable room for improvement of existing 
programs. 
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